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THE TIMELY EXECUTION OF TULSA
COUNTY SEARCH WARRANTS
The proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one. Its abuse
led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and this, taken
together with legislation regulating the process, should be lib-
erally construed in favor of the individual.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
Prior to the issuance of a search warrant, a court must find from
statements made under oath that sufficient evidentiary facts exist to
justify the issuance of the warrant. Once issued, the warrant must be
executed promptly. An Oklahoma statute provides that a search war-
rant, to be valid, must be executed and returned within ten days to
the issuing magistrate.' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has adopted a plain meaning interpretation of this statute, holding that
warrants executed after the ten-day period do not afford a lawful basis
for a search, whereas warrants executed within ten days after issuance
are prima facie timely executed.2 This article critically examines this
statutory interpretation with respect to Tulsa County search warrants
and suggests arguments for criminal defense attorneys who wish to
challenge the execution of a Tulsa County search warrant despite the
fact that it is executed within ten days after its issuance.
The Oklahoma statutory scheme for search and seizure3 envisions
the speediest possible execution of search warrants. Section 1225 of
title 22 sets out the requisites for all warrants:
If the magistrate be thereupon satisfied of the existence of
grounds of the application, or that there is probable cause to
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1231 (1971) states in full: "A search warrant must
be executed and returned to the magistrate by whom it is issued within ten days. After
the expiration of these times respectively, the warrant, unless executed is void."
2. Simmons v. State, 286 P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955); Overturf v. State,
102 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940). If an issuing court feels that a warrant
should be served within a shorter time than ten days, the court may place such a limita-
tion in the warrant. But if a warrant contains no limitation, it may be executed within
ten days after its issuance and the timeliness of its execution may not be questioned.
286 P.2d at 296.
3. The statutory provisions for search and seizure in Oklahoma are set out in title
22 of the Oklahoma statutes, sections 1221-1241.
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EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS
believe their existence, he must issue a search warrant,
signed by him, with his name of office, to a peace officer in
his county, commanding him forthwith to search the person
or place named, for the property specified, and to bring it
before the magistrate, and also to arrest the person in whose
possession the same may be found, to be dealt with according
to law. 4
In addition to the "forthwith" language of this statute, section 1226
of title 22 sets out the format with which Oklahoma search warrants
must substantially comply:
You are therefore commanded, in the daytime (or
"at any time of the day or night," as the case may be, accord-
ing to Section 1230, as amended, of Title 22 of the Oklahoma
Statutes), to make immediate search on the person of C.D.
(or "in the house situated," describing it, or any other place
to be searched, with reasonable particularity, as the case may
be), for the following property (describing it with reasonable
particularity), and if you find the same, or any part thereof,
to bring it forthwith before me, at (stating the place).5
The format followed by Tulsa County search warrants, however,
differs in one important aspect from the 1225 and 1226 guidelines:
the language requiring immediate execution of the warrant has been
deleted.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any
time of the day or night to make search of said person, ve-
hicle and/or premises the curtilage thereof and the appur-
tenances thereunto belonging for the described property, and
if found to seize the same and safely keep it, and bring it
before me at the Tulsa County Courthouse in accordance
with the subsequent order of the Court, and make return
hereof within ten days.0
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1225 (1971) (emphasis added).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1226 (1971) (emphasis added).
6. Tulsa County utilizes five different types of search warrants. The quoted lan-
guage appears in the Tulsa County general search warrant, which is applicable in any
situation. Special forms specifically authorize searches for narcotics, gambling para-
phernalia, alcohol, and stolen property. Their respective commands are as follows:
Narcotics Search Warrant:
YOU ARE TEHEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or
night to make search of said person, vehicle and/or house, building and prem-
ises, the curtilage thereof and the appurtenances thereunto belonging for the
described property, and if found to seize the same and safely keep it, and
bring it before me at the Tulsa County Courthouse in accordance with the
subsequent order of the Court, and make return hereof within ten days.
Gambling Paraphernalia Search Warrant:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or
1976]
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Since the Tulsa County warrant is silent as to the issue of immediate
service, the law enforcement official who is to serve the warrant can
reasonably infer from it that he may lawfully serve and return the
warrant anytime within ten days. Such an inference, however, violates
the express intention of sections 1225 and 1226, and is contrary to
the whole tenor of other constitutional' and statutory provisions govern-
ing the execution of search warrants.
night to make immediate search of said premises described, and to seize all
gambling and lottery paraphernalia there found, together with all implements,
furniture and fixtures and money used or kept for such illegal use as gambling
or lottery paraphernalia, and safely keep the same for disposition in accordance
with the subsequent order of this court, and make return of this warrant within
ten days hereof.
Alcohol Search Warrant:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or
night to make immediate search of the following described vehicle and/or
premises, the curtilage thereof and the appurtenances thereto belonging, situ-
ated in Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma . . .and to seize all alcoholic bev-
erages kept and possessed in violation of law, and all apparatus, equipment,
instrumentality and vehicle used in the manufacturing or transporting of al-
coholic beverages in violation of law, and safely keep the same for disposition
in accordance with the subsequent order of this Court, and make return hereof
within ten days from this date.
Stolen Property Search Warrant:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or
night to make immediate search of said vehicle and/or premises, the curtilage
thereof and the appurtenances thereunto belonging for the described property,
and if found to seize the same and safely keep the same for disposition in
accordance with the subsequent order of the Court, and also to arrest any
person in whose possession said property may be found, that he may be dealt
with according to law, and make return hereof within ten days from this date.
(emphasis added). Of the five types of warrants, only the specialized gambling para-
phernalia, alcohol and stolen property warrants command an immediate search; the nar-
cotics warrant and the general warrant make no such requirement. All five warrants
authorize night searches.
7. Apart from the Oklahoma statutory scheme, reasonable searches authorized by
search warrants are required by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which states in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
The Oklahoma version of the fourth amendment appears in article 2, section 30
of the Oklahoma Constitution, which states in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, describ-
ing as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.
Failure to strictly comply with the formalities required by state statute has been
held violative of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., State v. Morley, 5 N.J. Misc. 987,
139 A. 392 (1927) (warrant failing to command immediate service despite statutory
requirement violative of foruth amendment). The court relied on the Supreme Court's
language in Goueld v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921): "It has been repeatedly
decided that . . .[the fourth and fifth] Amendments should receive a liberal construe-
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The purpose for a search warrant in Oklahoma, as in every state,
is to insure that the thing 'to be seized is at the place to be searched
and to bring it before the magistrate.8 As a result, warrants are
directed to existing violations of the law and are issued only on a
showing to the satisfaction of the magistrate that the property in ques-
tion is presently at the place to be searched.9 Once satisfied, the magis-
trate issues a search warrant commanding immediate search.' 0 After
the premises have been searched for the specified property, the return
of the warrant to the magistrate must be expeditious."
Even without these statutory mandates, it is a matter of logical
necessity that all search warrants must be served without delay. Since
warrants are issued on the basis of allegations of presently existing
facts, it is essential that search warrants be executed promptly in order
to lessen the possibility that the situation existing at the time the
warrant was issued has not changed.' 2 If there is delay in execution,
not only may the property to be seized disappear, but there is the
additional danger that property brought to the premises after the
search warrant was issued will be seized. Despite these directives,
Tulsa County search warrants fail to command immediate service. 13
This failure to command immediate execution becomes particularly
objectionable when the warrant involved authorizes a night search.
Special circumstances must exist before the issuance of a night warrant
tion, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights
secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mis-
takenly over-zealous executive officers." Because Oklahoma statutory requirements are
not fulfilled in Tulsa County search warrants, execution of the warrants may be unrea-
sonable within the meaning of these constitutional provisions. See notes 20-42 infra
and accompanying text.
8. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1221, 1222 (1971).
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1223 (1971). Search warrants issued on affidavits which
fail to state facts showing probable cause are illegal. See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 99
P.2d 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940). Moreover, if any oral testimony is to be used
to supplement the affidavit, this testimony is to be transcribed "forthwith". OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1224.1 (1971).
10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, H§ 1225, 1226 (1971).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1233 (1971).
12. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recognizes probable cause as a time-
oriented concept because the facts on which issuance of a warrant are based are likely
to change: "Facts sufficient to provide probable cause at one point in time may not
be sufficient a year, a month, or even a day later." Warthen v. State, 47 OKLA. B.
A. J. 2950 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (invalidating search warrant because the affida-
vit on which it was based failed to state the time of the occurrence supporting the
warrant's issuance). The court, however, has yet to apply this flexible standard when
reviewing the timely execution of Oklahoma search warrants. See note 2 supra and
accompanying text.
13. See note 6 supra.
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can be justified. These requisites are set out in section 1230 of title 22:
The judge shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be
served in the daytime, unless the affidavits be positive that
the property is on the person, or in the place to be searched,
and the judge finds that there is likelihood that the property
named in the search warrant will be destroyed, moved or
concealed. In which case the judge may insert a direction
that it be served at any time of the day or night. 14
A simple reading of this statute indicates that night warrants are
the exception rather than the rule. Since they involve a greater intru-
sion than ordinary searches, their issuance requires a greater justifi-
cation. 13 The need for increased justification is reflected in the require-
ment that not only must the magistrate be assured from the affidavit
that the property is on the person or place to be searched, but there
must be a strong showing that the property in question is likely to be
destroyed, removed, or concealed unless an immediate search is al-
lowed. Accordingly, immediate execution is of the utmost necessity
when a night warrant is involved. 6
Tulsa County search warrants not only fail to command immediate
execution, they are routinely used to permit night searches. 17  By
routinely authorizing night searches, the issuance of such warrants is
not made contingent on the judicial determinations contemplated by
section 1230.18 Moreover, without words of immediacy, these war-
14. OK.A. STAT. tit. 22, § 1230 (1971).
15. In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search
be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision
to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness ...
. nfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonable-
ness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967) (standard of reasonableness
relaxed for area code enforcement inspections involving minimal intrusion). By impli-
cation, greater justification should be required for the issuance of a night warrant, which
is personal in nature and involves substantial intrusion into an individual's privacy.
16. Consider the typical drug case. Except when present in large quantities, nar-
cotics are easily transportable and concealable. When the contraband involved is of
this sort, the facts upon which probable cause is based can be easily and quickly al-
tered. Thus, in such a case it is unreasonable to expect this same contraband to be
found in a search roughly a week to ten days after the warrant was issued. Tulsa
County narcotics warrants, however, fail to command immediate execution. See Tulsa
County narcotics search warrant in note 6 supra.
17. See the five types of Tulsa County warrants in note 6 supra, all of which pro-
vide for searches "at any time of the day or night."
18. It seems clear that the Oklahoma legislature did not envision Tulsa County
mechanically issuing nothing but night warrants. The express language of section 1230
itself plainly indicates that only after the issuing judge is satisfied that an immediate
[Vol. 12:386
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ants permit the police to frustrate the intention of the Oklahoma legis-
lature as expressed in section 1230. Although policemen should be
allowed certain leeway in the performance of their duties, surely the
Oklahoma legislature did not wish to allow execution of night warrants
at the leisure of police, nor did they intend to invest policemen with
the discretion to execute the warrant at any time within the ten days
they believed to be the most advantageous. 19 Yet, despite the fact
that these warrants are only to be issued in the most exigent of cir-
cumstances, Tulsa County search warrants mechanically authorize night
searches in addition to discounting the statutory command of immediacy
to the point of exclusion.
Section 1231 of title 22 and its subsequent interpretation by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals represents the only justification
for delayed execution of search warrants. This section provides that:
"A search warrant must be executed and returned to the magistrate
search is necessary under the particular circumstances, may he authorize a night search.
In addition to the special criteria set out in section 1230 for the issuance of night
warrants, consider the language of section 1226 of title 22 which sets out the format
for Oklahoma search warrants: "You are therefore commanded, in the daytime (or
'at anytime day or night,' as the case may be, under Section 1230) to make immediate
search...." Clearly the legislature intended some warrants to be executed during the
day, and some to be executed "at any time of the day or night," provided that the
requisites for the issuance of a night warrant were justified under the particular circum-
stances in accordance with section 1230.
19. The fear of arbitrary intrusion by the police lies at the very core of the fourth
amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
In Simmons v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated: "It is an
integral part of our system of government that an officer assuming to execute process
upon the property or person of a citizen should execute it promptly." 286 P.2d 296,
298 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955). Other states have also construed the term "forthwith"
in a manner requiring diligence upon the part of executing authorities. See, e.g., State
v. Miller, 329 Mo. 855, 46 S.W.2d 541, 542 (1932); People v. Fetsko, 332 Ill. 110,
163 N.E. 359, 360 (1928); People v. Wiedeman, 324 Ill. 66, 154 N.E. 432 (1926);
State v. Guthrie, 90 Me. 448, 38 A. 368 (1897).
Delayed police action was also discouraged in Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d
871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 416 (1969):
A warrant is a court order requiring the police to perform a ministerial
function . .. . A lapse of up to ten days in execution may be reasonable
when the delay is caused by distance, traffic conditions, weather, inability to
locate the person or premises to be searched, personal safety, etc. However,
a delay of a few hours may be unreasonable if the police are not diligent
in executing the warrant and the purpose of the delay was to prejudice the
rights of the suspect.
382 F.2d at 885.
The police officer is not the only official who may not execute search warrants
at his own discretion. "Even the magistrate has no right, once he has determined that
the conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are in existence, to keep the suspect
under surveillance and postpone execution of the warrant until such time as it may
do the suspect the greatest harm." Mitchell v. United States, 258 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
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by whom it is issued within ten days. After the expiration of these times
respectively, the warrant, unless executed is void."' 20  This section's
invalidation of warrants executed after ten days has also been inter-
preted to support the validity of those warrants executed within ten
days.2 1
Although unambiguous, section 1231 must be read in light of
section 1225 (requiring forthwith command) ,22 section 1226 (com-
manding immediate service) ,23 and, in the case of a night warrant,
section 1230.24 More importantly, this section must be squared with
Article 2 section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution 2 and the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 These statutory and
constitutional provisions were designed to protect the privacy of the
citizen from unreasonable searches, and unless the strict standards set
for searches and seizures are satisfied, any ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of the individual. 7
Reading the statute in this light, it seems clear that the ten-day
provision of section 1231 is merely designed to serve as an outer limit
for timely service.28 To read the ten-day provision of section 1231
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1231 (1971).
21. See note 2 supra and accompanying text for the interpretation given the ten-
day provision of section 1231 by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1225 (1971). See text accompanying note 4 supra for
an examination of the language of this section commanding forthwith service.
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1226 (1971). See text accompanying note 5 supra for
an examination of the immediacy language required to be placed in Oklahoma search
warrants.
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1230 (1971). See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra
for the circumstances required for the issuance of a night warrant.
25. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 30. The full text of this provision appears in note
7 supra. For an example of how this section has been interpreted, see MeClary v.
State, 246 P. 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926) (warrant not served until fourteen days
after its issuance invalid).
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, designed to protect individuals from unreasonable
searches, applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949). The full text of the fourth amendment appears in note 7 supra.
27. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956); Sgro v. United States, 287
U.S. 206, 210 (1932); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Marron
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32
(1927); Goueld v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Representative of this principle is the statement by Chief
Justice Hughes in Sgro: "The proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one. Its abuse
led to the adoption of the fourth amendment, and this, together with legislation regulat-
ing the process, should be liberally construed in favor of the individual." 287 U.S.
at 210 (search warrant not timely executed held invalid).
28. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE and J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 261-
62 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR, LAFAVE & IsREAL]. For a similar
interpretation of the ten-day limit see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c), which requires the "offi-
cer to search within a specified period of time not to exceed ten days, the person or
7
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as allowing an unexplained ten-day delay in the execution of any search
warrant,29 particularly a night warrant, is not only to read out of the
statute the logical requirement that service must be made immediately,"0
and the constitutional requirement of reasonableness with regard to
the execution of search warrants,3 but also to reject all the other statu-
tory requirements intended to insure the speediest possible execution of
search warrants.3 2  Just because a warrant is executed within the ten-
day period does not necessarily mean that its execution is timely. 33
Such an interpretation is mandated not only because every hour of
delay endangers future prosecution, but also because every hour of
place named or the property specified." The lower federal courts adopted the "outer
limit" interpretation, making the time of execution as essential as any other element
when determining the validity of a search warrant. See cases in note 33 infra.
A cursory examination of other aspects of Oklahoma's warrant scheme seems to
support a similar interpretation of Oklahoma's ten-day provision. The express language
of sections 1225 (requiring forthwith command) and 1226 (requiring immediate service
language), coupled with the judicial findings necessary to support the issuance of a
night warrant under section 1230, leaves little doubt that while a warrant may be re-
turned within ten days, a search must be immediate.
29. The holding in Simmons v. State, 286 P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) would
protect this hypothetical warrant from attack. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 12 and 13 supra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 7,25-27 supra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 4-5, 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
33. This has been the approach taken by the federal circuit courts in their interpre-
tation of FED. R. CiuM. P. 41(c) which requires the "officer to search within a speci-
fied period of time not to exceed ten days, the person or place named or the property
specified."
Although the following cases upheld the search warrants involved, all agreed that
execution within the ten-day period is not necessarily timely and that a search warrant
whose execution is unduly delayed is illegal. Moreover, every case rejected a mechanical
interpretation of the ten-day provision of 41(c), holding that what constitutes a reason-
able delay in execution should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The test applied in every case was whether the probable cause that initially justified
the warrant still existed at the time the warrant was executed, and whether the reasons
given for the delay in execution were justifiable under the circumstances. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975) (8-day delay); United States
v. Wilson, 491 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1974) (six-day delay); United States v. Rael, 467
F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973) (five-day delay); United
States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970) (six-
day delay); United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1002 (1970) (nine-day delay); United States v. Bradley, 428 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1970); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
393 U.S. 410 (1969) (2 hours and 10 minutes delay).
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has foreclosed the application of "con-
tinuing probable cause" through its holding in Simmons. See note 2 supra and accom-
panying text. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of Tulsa County search war-
rants, since delays of this kind are to be expected when the warrants fail to command
immediate service in violation of a statute that requires this command. See notes 3-
13 supra and accompanying text.
34. "No case can be stated in which a needless delay of service will aid the prosecu-
8
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delay infringes an individual's fourth amendment protection from un-
reasonable searches.3" This amendment has been held to protect
individuals from search warrants which have inadequately described
the place to be searched,36 which have resulted in the seizure of items
not listed in the search warrant,3 and which were executed without
notice by police who gained illegal entry.38  In accordance with the
fourth amendment's requirement that warrants must be based on prob-
able cause, 39 warrants which are based on information that has become
stale between the time of observation of the facts and issuance of the
warrant are void, and evidence provided by the subsequent search
under these circumstances must be suppressed.40  If Oklahoma war-
rants can be constitutionally challenged because they are untimely
issued by magistrates six to eight days after the alleged observation
of criminal activity, they should also be susceptible to challenge when
they are untimely executed by police officers six to eight days after their
issuance,"' especially when execution is pursuant to a warrant which
tion .... Every hour's delay, whether from the officer's inefficiency or from his
collusion with respondents, endangers the success of the prosecution." Mitchell v.
United States, 258 F.2d 435, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Delay in the execution of a warrant is inherently
prejudicial to the defendant, since facts sufficient to provide probable cause at one point
in time may rapidly dissipate. For a liberal interpretation of what constitutes prejudicial
delay in the execution of a search warrant, see United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp.
158 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
36. See KAmiSAR, LAFAVE & ISREAL, supra note 28, at 259 for a discussion of this
issue.
37. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISREAL, supra note 28, at 264 for a discussion of this
issue.
38. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISREAL, supra note 28, at 261 for a discussion of this
issue.
39. U.S. CONST. amend IV states in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
." (emphasis added).
40. Such warrants are without probable cause, since there is no longer sufficient
probability that the property is located in a particular place. Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108,111 (1964). The standard used to test this probability of present possession
must necessarily vary from case to case, depending on whether the offense is one of
a continuing nature. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932).
Following these principles, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals utilizes a flex-
ible test for the determination of whether there is probable cause in light of the lapse
of time between observation and issuance of the warrant. All of the facts in each
individual case must be considered. See, e.g., Warthen v. State, 47 OrLA. B. ASs'N
J. 2950 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). For a collection of authority on the issue of staleness
between the time of observation and issuance, see Comment, A Fresh Look at Stale
Probable Cause: Examining the Timeliness Requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
59 IowA L.R. 1308 (1974).
41. Such warrants are without continuing probable cause. The only difference be-
tween this situation and the situation in note 40 is that in the latter the delay was
9
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fails to command immediate search in violation of statutes that require
such commands. Thus, if so much time has transpired between is-
suance and execution that the facts justifying the initial finding of
probable cause are likely to have changed, the information upon which
the issuance was based should be considered stale, the search deemed
unreasonable, and any evidence procured as a result of the search held
inadmissible because of untimely execution.42
between observation and issuance, not issuance and execution. Both situations, however,
may represent unreasonable delays. See note 33 supra and cases cited therein for an
explanation of how the test of continuing probable cause has been applied by the lower
federal courts.
Although Oklahoma follows a flexible case-by-case approach in determining
whether there is a sufficient time relationship between observation and issuance, the
court follows a rigid interpretation when reviewing delays between issuance and execu-
tion. Compare note 12 and note 40 supra with note 2 supra and accompanying text.
42. This is not to say that every search warrant that is not immediately executed
is inherently invalid. The question to be decided in each case is whether an unjustifiable
period was allowed to pass between issuance and execution.
Even when narcotics are involved, a number of circumstances may justify a finding
that a warrant's execution was timely despite some delay. If, for example, the search
warrant is directed at a known narcotics dealer who is presently dealing in large quan-
tities, with a staff of several peddlers and a stream of addicts going in and out of
the premises, and if there is a desire to protect the safety of the informant due to
the criminal reputation of the dealer, there is little doubt that the probable cause that
existed at the time a warrant was issued would still be in existence a week or even
ten days later. Moreover, there may be other valid reasons which would justify the
delay in execution (see the quotation from Spinelli in note 19 supra).
Contrast this situation, however, with the Tulsa County night warrant issued in
the recent case of Brown v. State, No. CRF-76-2886 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Feb., 1976). The
affidavit supporting the warrant stated in pertinent part:
Affiant further states that in the last twenty-four hours he was met by
confidential informant that advised the following:
The informant advised that a Negro male going in the name of Sylvester
Snell was selling marijuana at the above described apartment.
Further your affiant advises that he accompanied the informant to the
above described apartment within the last twenty-four hours and after having
searched the informant and finding no money or drugs, gave the informant
ten dollars ($10.00) U.S. Currency.
Your affiant then observed the informant enter the above described apart-
ment, stay twenty minutes, after which the informant returned directly to your
affiant. Your affiant then searched the informant and found approximately
one ounce of marijuana but no other controlled substances or money.
The informant advised your affiant that the informant had purchased this
marijuana from Sylvester Snell.
Note that this affidavit contains no allegations of large quantities of narcotics either
seen or being sold in the apartment in question, no allegations relating to any past
dealings with Sylvester Snell, no allegations underlying the informant's belief that Syl-
vester Snell was selling marijuana in his apartment, no allegations as to the criminal
reputation of Sylvester Snell, and no allegations as to any systematic activity involving
the selling of marijuana by Sylvester Snell. However, because the informant made one
purchase for $10 on the night in question, the magistrate had sufficient probable cause
for believing the contraband was presently located in the particular apartment at the
time the search warrant was applied for. Accordingly, a Tulsa County night warrant
was issued, which failed to command immediate service. See narcotics warrant in note
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What constitutes a reasonable delay in executing a search war-
rant should depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case. Unfortunately, however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals has foreclosed such an inquiry through its interpretation of section
1231's ten-day provision. Rather than adopting a case-by-case analysis
utilizing the concept of continuing probable cause,43 the court has opted
for a rigid rule, allowing no challenge to the timeliness of warrants
executed within the statutory period.4" The mechanical application that
this interpretation permits, particularly with respect to night warrants,45
is seemingly inconsistent with the express intent of the Oklahoma legis-
lature's statutory scheme for the execution of search warrants as well
as with the Oklahoma constitution and the United States Constitution.
More importantly, delays in the execution of Tulsa County search
warrants are to be expected, since the warrants fail to command im-
mediate execution. If the exclusionary rule is to have continuing
6 supra. The officers in this case did not execute the warrant immediately. They
waited until more than seven days after the issuance of the warrant, and more than
eight days after the informant's $10 buy, before breaking into the home of Sylvester
Snell and seizing the evidence which formed the basis of Brown v. State. Sylvester
Snell was not even home when the warrant was served. The total marijuana recovered
consisted of P12 ounce of marijuana, six marijuana cigarette butts, and some marijuana
residue and seeds; an amount lending little support to the informer's contention that
Sylvester Snell was selling marijuana in his apartment.
This case provides a good illustration of the concept of continuing probable cause.
Examining the sparse allegations of the affidavit, immediate execution of this warrant
was of the utmost necessity. Under these circumstances, the probable cause that existed
on October 19, when the night warrant was issued, did not continue until the execution
of the warrant on the evening of October 26. Assume, for example, that this seven-
day delay had occurred between observation and issuance, not issuance and execution.
If the police officer had come to the magistrate with one bag of marijuana purchased
eight days earlier, making the same allegations (or lack thereof) as appeared in the
previous affidavit, it is obvious that this information would be too stale to support the
issuance of a search warrant. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. If the
magistrate could not lawfully issue a warrant based on this eight-day-old information,
the policemen in this case should not have been permitted to lawfully execute the war-
rant based on eight day old information. Accordingly, it was wholly unreasonable to
execute this warrant under these circumstances seven days after its issuance, and the
motion to suppress for untimely execution in this case should have been sustained.
Moreover, since the night warrant failed to command immediate execution, it is
possible that the seven-day delay was the result of the officer's understanding that they
had ten days in which to execute the warrant. This belief is legally erroneous in light
of the legislative admonitions underlying the relevant statutory and constitutional provi-
sions already mentioned.
43. See note 33 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this concept.
44. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
45. This interpretation, for example, forecloses any inquiry into the timely execu-
tion of a Tulsa County night warrant executed after an unexplained expiration of nine
days following its issuance, despite the fact that night warrants are only to be issued
when an immediate search is of the utmost necessity. See notes 14-19 supra and ac-
companying text.
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vitality in Oklahoma and if Oklahoma statutes are to be read con-
sistently with their drafter's intent and the dictates of the fourth amend-
ment, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should reconsider
its longstanding interpretation of section 1231 and, at a minimum, force
Tulsa County search warrants into compliance with the statutory re-
quirements that were meant to govern their execution.
Layn R. Phillips
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